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Contracts 
by William T. Laube* 
In any given twelve-month reporting period there is, for 
some reason, a case emphasis on particular problems in each 
major classification of the law. The field of contracts is 
no exception. For the period covered by this volume, two 
basic contract problems float to the surface in the pool of 
reported appellate decisions. They will be treated separately. 
I. Additional Compensation: The Obligation to Pay "More 
Money". 
The first problem discussed, and illustrated by a number of 
recent cases, l relates to the obligation to pay "more money" 
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J.D. 1937, University of Washington; 
L.L.M. 1945, Columbia University. 
Morrison Professor of Law, University 
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tracts. 
The Author extends his appreciation 
to Victor T. Schaub, second-year stu-
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of this article. 
1. The cases are, and will be dis-
cussed in the following sequence: Healy 
v. Brewster, 23 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1962); 
Healy v. Brewster, 59 Ca1.2d 455, 30 
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for merchandise or services than that provided for in the 
original contract. There are various background situations 
which activate the demand for "more money," but the most 
common are unanticipated cost increases or fluctuating market 
prices. 
The one industry that in recent years has repeatedly faced 
this problem, at least in the reported cases, is the construction 
industry. In a most interesting series of opinions, all dealing 
with the case of Healy v. Brewster,2 the problem was dissected 
and examined in detail. These opinions are valuable, not 
only because of what they decide, but because they demon-
strate the many different techniques of offense and defense 
that are available. 
The operative facts of the Healy case, as gleaned from 
Justice Burke's opinion,3 were as follows: Healy, as general 
contractor for construction of an air strip for the County of 
Los Angeles, entered into a subcontract with Brewster to 
remove soil from areas designated as borrow pits, and to com-
pact it in place as the subsoil for the airstrip. The contract 
required the excavating, transporting and compacting of 
approximately 182,000 cubic yards of dirt. The county had 
supplied the general contractor with corings of subsurface 
conditions including the borrow pits. None of the legends 
Cal. Rptr. 129, 380 P.2d 817 (1963); 
Healy v. Brewster, 251 Cal. App.2d 541, 
59 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1967); Wunderlich 
v. State ex reI. Dept. of Pub. Works, 
65 Cal.2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr. 473, 423 
P.2d 545 (1967); E. H. Morrill Co. v. 
State, 65 Cal.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 479, 
423 P.2d 551 (1967); Souza & McCue 
Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 
2d 508, 20 Cal. Rptr. 634, 370 P.2d 338 
(1962); City of Salinas v. Souza & Mc-
Cue Constr. Co., 66 Cal.2d 217,57 Cal. 
Rptr. 337, 424 P.2d 921 (1967). 
2. The Healy case was appealed to 
the district court of appeal and, for the 
reasons set forth in an opinion written 
by Justice Burke, the judgment of the 
trial court in favor of Brewster was af-
firmed. 23 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1962). A 
78 CAL LAW 1967 
hearing was granted by the California 
Supreme Court as a result of which the 
judgment was reversed and a new trial 
granted. 59 Cal.2d 455,380 P.2d 817, 
30 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1963). The supreme 
court opinion was written by Justice 
McComb. The case was retried, a judg-
ment again entered for Brewster, and 
again the case was appealed to the dis-
trict court of appeal. Pursuant to an 
opinion written by Justice Pro Tern 
Frampton, the judgment of the trial 
court was again affirmed, 251 Cal. App. 
2d 541, 59 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1967). Ref-
erence to these cases will hereafter be 
made by referring to the name of the 
Justice writing the opinion. 
3. 23 Cal. Rptr~ 917 (1962). 
2
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for the corings indicated the presence of any hardpan. Brew-
ster made no independent soil investigation and relied entirely 
upon the corings made by the county. 
Under the terms of the subcontract with Healy, Brewster 
agreed to be bound by all the conditions imposed upon Healy 
in his contract with the county. Those conditions included 
a statement that the general contractor should make his own 
inspection of the site, and that the soil information given 
was to show conditions only as they were believed to exist. 
The county's statement in reference to the soil tests contained 
the following: 
[I]t is not intended or to be inferred that the conditions 
as shown thereon constitute a representation or war-
ranty, express or implied, by the County or its officers, 
that such conditions are actually existent nor shall the 
Contractor be relieved of the liability under contract, 
nor the County or any of its officers be liable for any 
loss sustained by the Contractor as a result of any vari-
ance between conditions as shown on the plans and 
the actual condition revealed during the progress of the 
work or otherwise.4 
Shortly after Brewster moved into the first borrow pit to 
start excavating, he encountered large amounts of hardpan 
material. To use such material for the air strip required 
additional and expensive earth-moving equipment, followed 
by a pulverizing process that greatly increased Brewster's 
costs. When Brewster brought this unanticipated difficulty 
to the attention of Healy and threatened to stop work because 
of it, he was promised "more money"; that is, he would be 
compensated for the extra expense if he would finish the job. 
Healy tried to pass this additional cost on to the county. Upon 
the county's refusal to pay more because of the hardpan dif-
ficulties, Healy refused to carry out his promise to Brewster 
of additional compensation. 
Healy filed a complaint for declaratory relief and Brewster 
filed a cross-complaint for damages. The trial court, upon 
4. 251 Cal. App.2d at 547, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. at 755 (1967). 
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conclusion of the first trial of the case, entered a judgment in 
favor of Brewster for $61,108.05, plus an additional $16,000 
for attorneys' fees. It found the promise to compensate for 
the extra expenses enforceable under the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel. Upon appeal to the district court of appeal, 
the judgment of the trial court was affirmed, not on the basis 
that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was necessarily appli-
cable, but instead on the ground that there was sufficient 
consideration to render the promise enforceable. 
The Supreme Court of California granted a hearing, unan-
imously reversed the trial court judgment, and granted a new 
trial.5 Justice McComb noted that the theory of Brewster's 
original cross-complaint was for either breach of the original 
contract or failure to pay for extra work. As the trial court 
had found that there had been a failure of proof on both 
theories, Justice McComb was of the opinion that it was 
error to grant a judgment on the basis of an oral modification 
of the original contract in that "their trial tactics might well 
have been different had they known the importance of the 
oral promise [of modification] during the trial."s The opinion 
did, however, discuss the applicability of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel. 
Upon the second trial of the case, the pleading properly 
raised the issue of the enforceability of the oral promise of 
"more money" in modification of the original contract. It 
also brought into consideration for the first time the matter 
of implied warranties. Again, a judgment for Brewster was 
entered by the trial court, again there was an appeal to the 
Court of Appeal for the Second District,7 and again there was 
affirmance of the trial court with a detailed discussion of the 
applicability of the different theories applicable to the problem. 
5. 59 Cal.2d 455, 30 Cal. Rptr. 129, to the Healy case is discussed infra, this 
380 P.2d 817 (1963). article. 
6. 59 Cal.2d at 464, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 7. 251 Cal. App.2d 541, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
134, 380 P.2d at 822. The doctrine of 752 (1967). 
promissory estoppel and its applicability 
~o CAL I,.AW 11167 
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A. Consideration for Modification 
The key code sections for modification of contracts, other 
than those covered by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, provide: 
A contract not in writing may be altered in any respect 
by consent of the parties, in writing, without a new 
consideration, and is extinguished thereby to the extent 
of the new alteration. ( California Civil Code § 1697) 
A contract in writing may be altered by a contract in 
writing, or by an executed oral agreement, and not other-
wise. (California Civil Code § 1698) 
These sections do not use the word "modification" but instead 
"alteration." However, for the purpose of the situation under 
discussion the words are synonymous. 8 
From the statutory language it is apparent that there are 
two basic factual determinations that must be made in working 
with the consideration problem: (1) whether the modifica-
tion agreement is executory or executed; and (2) whether it 
is oral or in writing. As to an executory written modifica-
tion of an oral contract, Civil Code section 1697 dispenses 
with the consideration requirement and substitutes in its place 
the formality of a writing.9 However, for an executory oral 
modification of an oral contract all the elements of a contract 
must be present, including consideration. Section 1698, by 
use of the word "contract" in the phrase ". may be 
altered by a contract in writing, ." makes consideration 
8. "Alteration" is the word usually 
used to describe a change made in the 
figures or language of a written instru-
ment, often done without authority and 
as part of a fraudulent scheme to change 
the legal effect of the instrument. See-
ton 3407 of the California Uniform 
Commercial Code deals with the effect 
of alteration of commercial paper. This 
is an entirely different problem from the 
one being discussed in this article. Here 
we are dealing with consensual changes 
in the prior contract obligations of the 
6 
party, resulting either from oral agree-
ment or a writing integrating that agree-
ment. 
9. Dispensing with the consideration 
requirement and substituting in its place 
the formality of a writing is a device 
used in other parts of the California 
Civil Code. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1524, 
1541. See also the elimination of the 
consideration requirement for modifica-
tion of sales contracts in Cal. Comm. 
Code § 2209, discussed infra in this ar-
ticle. 
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an indispensable element of every executory modification of 
a written contract, as contrasted with an oral one. 
The Healy case involved an oral modification of a written 
contract. The search for consideration was difficult but ideas 
developed as the litigation progressed. Consideration is de-
fined in Civil Code section 1605 as follows: 
Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon 
the promisor, by any other person, to which the promisor 
is not lawfully entitled, or any prejudice suffered, or 
agreed to be suffered, by such person, other than such 
as he is at the time of consent lawfully bound to suffer, 
as an inducement to the promisor, is a good consideration 
for a promise. 
The stumbling block was that Brewster was already obligated 
to remove and compact the required dirt from the borrow 
pits. It was argued by Healy that Brewster was doing no 
more than he was already legally obligated to do and that, 
therefore, there was neither detriment to Brewster nor benefit 
to Healy. This effect of existing duty on consideration has 
long been the rule of law in California, and most other juris-
dictions.10 
Justice Burke was of the opinion that the Healy case fell 
within the "unexpected difficulty" exception to the "existing 
duty" bar. His opinion stated: 
However, the general rule has often been subjected to 
the important qualification that such a promise will be 
given effect where unanticipated and substantial difficul-
ties arise which cause the contractor to refuse to com-
plete the work at the contract price and the contractee 
promises the additional compensation to induce the con-
tractor to continue performance.ll 
In applying this "unexpected difficulty" exception it is 
accepted that the difficulty must not be within the contem-
10. A leading case in California so 
holding, and referred to in the Healy 
case, is Western Lithograph Co. v. Van-
omar Producers, 185 Cal. 366, 197 P. 
82 CAL LAW 1967 
103 (1921). For a collection of cases, 
see 12 A.L.R.2d 80. See also WILLIS-
TON ON CONTRACTS, 3d ed., § 130. 
11. 23 Cal. Rptr. at 922. 
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plation of the parties. The court quoted from King v. Duluth, 
M. & N. Ry.,12 which emphasized this point.13 The court also 
distinguished Western Lithograph Company v. Vanomar Pro-
ducers,14 in that the difficulty in that case resulted from an 
increase in the market price of labor and materials and, 
therefore, in that court's opinion, was within the contempla-
tion of the parties. 
It was on this issue of contemplation of the risk that Justice 
McComb differed with Justice Burke. In reviewing the facts 
of the case, Justice McComb emphasized that Brewster relied 
entirely on the soil tests made by the county engineer and 
made no test of his own, and that Brewster was aware that 
the county had expressly disclaimed liability for any erroneous 
soil reports. From these facts it can be concluded that 
Brewster assumed the risk of error in the soil testing; or 
to say the same thing in a different way, assumed the risk of 
mistake. If there is no right to be discharged from the original 
contract under the doctrine of rescission for mistake, then 
the duty to perform remains and performance of that duty 
fails as consideration. 
In applying the "unexpected difficulty" rule to establish 
the consideration for the modification agreement, there still 
remains a cloudy area in California law. Must the difficulty, 
the risk of which has not been assumed, be such as to be a 
basis for rescission for mistake? If it is a basis for rescission, 
the consideration can better be described as the giving up 
of a right to rescind. The King case, in describing a sufficient 
"unexpected difficulty", stated that the mistake: 
need not be such as would legally justify the party in 
his refusal to perform his contract, unless promised extra 
pay, or to justify a court of equity in relieving him from 
the contract; for they are sufficient if they are of such 
a character as to render the party's demand for extra 
pay manifestly fair, so as to rebut all inference that he 
12. 61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 plation of the parties when the contract 
(1895). was made." 61 Minn. at 488, 63 N.W. 
13. The court stated that the difficul- at 1107. 
ties and burdens "must be substantial, 14. 185 Cal. 366, 197 P. 103 (1921). 
unforeseen, and not within the contem-
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is seeking to be relieved from an unsatisfactory contract, 
or to take advantage of the necessities of the opposite 
party to coerce from him a promise for further compen-
sation.15 
In the first Healy trial, the trial judge instructed the jury: 
that there had been a mutual mistake of fact on the part 
of [Healy and Brewster] regarding the nature of the soil 
to be excavated, and that the execution of the contract 
having been conditioned thereon to a considerable de-
gree, [Brewster] for a reasonable time after discovering 
the mistake had the right to rescind the contract, but 
that he had not exercised such right.16 
As indicated, if a right to rescind exists, the consideration 
problem becomes, at least, easier. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Tentative Draft 
No.2, 1965) adopts the rule of the King case in a proposed 
new section 89D.17 However, where there is an "existing 
duty" to perform, it does not call completion of the perform-
ance "consideration." The comment to the proposed section 
explains that to do so would violate the traditional pre-existing 
duty rule of the contracts restatement. Instead, the new 
section has been placed in a chapter entitled "Contracts With-
out Consideration." However sensible this restatement ap-
proach may be, in California it runs into the difficulty of the 
language of Civil Code section 1698 which requires a "con-
tract." The elements of contract are set forth in Civil Code 
section 1550 and include "consideration."18 
15. 61 Minn. at 488, 63 N.W. at 1107 
(1895). 
16. 59 Cal.2d at 462, 30 Cal. Rptr. 
at 133, 380 P.2d at 821 (1963). 
17. § 89D. MODIFICATION OF EXECU-
TORY CONTRACT. 
"A promise modifying a duty under 
a contract not fully performed on either 
side is binding 
(a) if the modification is fair and 
equitable in view of circumstances not 
anticipated when contract was made; or 
84 CAL LAW 1967 
(b) to the extent provided by statute; 
or 
(c) to the extent that justice requires 
enforcement in view of material change 
of position in reliance on the promise." 
18. That section provides: "It is es-
sential to the existence of a contract that 
there should be: 
1. Parties capable of contracting; 
2. Their consent; 
3. A lawful object; and, 
4. A sufficient cause or considera-
tion." 
8
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While Civil Code section 1605 gives the common-law defi-
nition of consideration, the section immediately following 
states additional situations that are also a "good considera-
tion" for a promise. That section provides: 
An existing legal obligation resting upon the promisor, 
or a moral obligation originating in some benefit con-
ferred upon the promisor, or prejudice suffered by the 
promisee, is also a good consideration for a promise, 
to an extent corresponding with the extent of the obliga-
tion, but no further or otherwise. 
This section has been examined many times by California 
courts and there are numerous statements in the cases that 
the moral obligation referred to is one resulting from some 
past legal obligation. I9 However, all the literal wording of 
the statute requires is "a moral obligation originating in some 
benefit conferred upon the promisor or prejudice suffered 
by the promisee." An argument can be made that while 
"pre-existing duty" may bar the sufficiency of the consideration 
under section 1605, it does not have that result under section 
1606. In other words, the willingness to proceed in spite 
of the difficulty creates a moral obligation to compensate 
for the increased costs. 
Upon appea120 following retrial of the Healy case, Justice 
Frampton affirmed the findings of the trial court on the issue 
of consideration. Three separate bases were articulated. The 
trial court had found that promising to pay for work rendered 
after encountering unforeseen difficulty is enforceable as con-
sideration supported notwithstanding the existing duty. There 
is no neat and unencumbered holding that such a promise 
was enforceable without consideration under the approach of 
section 89D of Restatement of Contracts (Second). In his 
opinion, Justice Frampton set forth Civil Code sections 1605 
and 1606 in their entirety. It is difficult to tell whether he 
19. See e.g. Leonard v. Gallagher, 20. 251 Cal. App.2d 541, 59 Cal. 
235 Cal. App.2d 362, 45 Cal. Rptr. 211 Rptr. 752 (1967). 
(1965); Foltz v. First Trust & Say. Bank 
of Pasadena, 86 Cal. App.2d 59, 194 P. 
2d 95 (1948). 
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felt that the pre-existing duty bar does not apply when un-
expected difficulty is present, or whether he was following 
the line of reasoning just set forth that such difficulty at least 
creates a moral obligation under section 1606. 
As a separate basis for consideration, the trial court also 
had found that Brewster was entitled to rescind for mutual 
mistake, and that the giving up of that right of rescission 
was sufficient. Justice Frampton recognized that there can 
be no rescission for mistake if the party has assumed that 
risk. In working out his conclusion on this issue, he referred 
to facts that were not mentioned in either of the two prior 
opinions. Whether they were even disclosed in the first trial 
is not known. He pointed out that soil borings are usually 
handled by using a drill with a hollow cylinder that cuts out a 
core from the subsurface. The composition of the core is 
then analyzed and its structure plotted as a vertical profile. 
What had happened here, unfortunately, was that the county 
engineer had used a rotary earth drill rather than the cus-
tomary coring drill. The rotary drill ground up the subsoil 
as it extracted it. Ground-up hardpan has the same char-
acteristics as sand and sandy loam, which explains why the 
county engineer's report was so misleading. From these facts 
Justice Frampton concluded that while Brewster might have 
assumed the risk of subsoil conditions if the county's borings 
had been made in the accepted manner, he did not assume 
the risk when borings were made in a manner he had no reason 
to anticipate. This is a forceful demonstration of the impor-
tance of getting into evidence all facts that bear upon assump-
tion of risk. Too many attorneys have evidence available 
to them that is never introduced, either because they don't 
know of its existence because of failure to make a sufficient 
investigation of their case, or because they fail to realize its 
importance. 
A third basis for consideration was also expressed in the 
OpInIOn. The court stated: "Also forbearance to press a 
claim or a promise of such forbearance, may be a sufficient 
consideration even though the claim is wholly ill-founded."l 
1. 251 Cal. App.2d at 551, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. at 758. 
86 CAL LAW 1967 
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The right to pursue a claim is a legal right, even though if 
pursued no remedy may be granted. To forego such right is 
therefore a legal detriment, and thus within the definition of 
Civil Code section 1605. The only weakness of this theory 
is that the facts must show that the promise to pay was given 
as a "bargained-for exchange" for the forbearance of, or the 
promise to forbear, the assertion of the claim. The fact that 
forbearance is a result of the promise is not enough. It must 
be a "bargained-for forbearance." It it at least open to ques-
tion, from the facts related in the opinions, that such a bar-
gaining process took place. 
B. Applicability of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel 
It is again worth noting that, in the first Healy trial, 
Brewster proceeded on the theory that there was either breach 
of the original contract, or that the hardpan problem was 
an "extra" for which Brewster was entitled to additional com-
pensation. At the conclusion of the case the trial judge ruled 
that Brewster's original theories of recovery had not been 
proven but that the evidence sustained a recovery by appli-
cation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Thereupon 
the court permitted amendment of the cross-complaint to 
conform to proof of promissory estoppel, and the jury was 
given a number of instructions relating to the elements and 
scope of this theory of recovery. 
As previously indicated, the California Supreme Court held 
it was error and unfair to Healy to have permitted this amend-
ment at this time of the trial. In addition, the court pointed 
out why the doctrine has no application in a case of this kind. 
Such discussion is helpful not only in understanding this case 
but in forecasting when the application of promissory estoppel 
will be deemed proper. 
Justice McComb stated that when there is a request for 
services in return for a promise to pay money, you have a 
bargained-for exchange taking place. In such a situation, if 
the services are detrimental there is good consideration, not 
promissory estoppel. To use the words of Justice McComb, 
" it is only where the reliance was unbargained for 
that there is room for application of the doctrine of promissory 
CAL LAW 1967 87 
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estoppel.,,2 As previously discussed, in the supreme court's 
view of the case the "pre-existing duty" to perform prevented 
the services of Brewster from being detrimental, consideration 
was therefore lacking and the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
had no applicability. 
C. Writing Requirement 
When dealing with an executory modification agreement, 
Civil Code section 1698 requires not only the elements of 
a contract, but that, in addition, the agreement be in writing. 3 
It is like a statute of frauds requirement. At times the 
writing requirement of section 1698 is confused with the 
parol evidence rule. Parol evidence is inadmissible to vary 
the terms on any subject that has been integrated into a 
written memorandum of the contract. 4 The excluded parol, 
however, deals with prior or contemporaneous agreements 
at variance with the writing, and not with agreements subse-
quent to the writing. The reasoning behind the parol evidence 
rule is that the integration of the terms into written form fixes 
them as the final terms of the contract, superseding anything 
to the contrary. Terms subsequent to the writing are new 
terms never previously integrated, and the requirement that 
they be in writing is imposed to prevent fraudulent claims 
of modification. Parol becomes inadmissible because of the 
protective writing requirement, not because of any concept 
of finality of the agreement process. 
In the Healy case the promise to pay more money was oral. 
For that reason alone it would have been unenforceable had 
it remained executory. The only thing that saved it was the 
finding of execution of the agreement. 
D. Execution of the Modification 
As has already been stated, a modification becomes enforce-
able under Civil Code section 1698 if there is a written con-
sideration-supported promise, or if there is an executed agree-
2. 59 Ca1.2d at 463, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 4. Cal. Civ. Code § 1639; Cal. Code 
134, 380 P.2d at 822 (1963). Civ. Proc. § 1856. 
3. Cal. Civ. Code § 1698 is set forth 
in the text of this article, supra. 
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ment. Case law has carefully pointed out that the word 
"agreement" in this second alternative is to be distinguished 
from the word "contract" in the first alternative; "agreement" 
involves no more than mutual assent, while "contract" re-
quires the four essential elements of Civil Code section 1550.5 
For some reason section 1698 refers only to an executed 
oral agreement. There seems no basis for a differentiation 
between oral and written agreements as far as execution as 
an alternative to consideration is concerned. The motivation 
for enforceability applies with equal force to both. It has 
long been recognized that once any transaction has been vol-
untarily performed, the law will not step in and set it aside. 
The most obvious analogy is to a gift transaction. While a 
gift promise is not enforceable, a completed gift cannot be 
revoked. 6 An executed modification agreement, like a gift 
transaction, may lack consideration. It often is not literally 
a gift, however, because of absence of any donative intent. 
But in both situations voluntary execution makes the trans-
action final for the common reason that the status of parties, 
once the transaction has been voluntarily performed, should 
be protected. 
While it is not difficult to understand why an executed 
transaction should be protected, deciding what constitutes 
execution has proven quite complex. There are two types 
of modification agreements that call for the payment of "more 
money." One is the non-consideration-supported promise 
where nothing is required by the recipient additional to that 
which he is already obligated to perform. In this situation, 
execution of the modification will require the money to be paid, 
since that is the only performance that has been modified. 
The other type is where the modification involves a considera-
tion-supported transaction, in other words, where something 
different is required from both parties. The Supreme Court 
5. In D. L. Godbey & Sons Constr. 
Co. v. Deane, 39 Ca1.2d at 432, 246 
P.2d at 948 (1952), Justice Traynor 
reached the same conclusion by stating: 
"Section 1698 has a dual operation. On 
the one hand it invalidates oral contracts 
of modification that are unexecuted, and 
on the other hand, it validates executed 
agreements that might otherwise fail for 
lack of consideration." 
6. Cal. Civ. Code § 1148. 
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of California decided in Godbey & Sons Construction Com-
pany v. Deane7 that where the promise of additional compen-
sation is supported by consideration and the consideration 
has been received, there is "execution" of the modification 
agreement even though the promised additional funds have 
not yet been paid. 8 
These principles became of vital importance in the Healy 
case as the promise to pay "more money" was oral and 
unenforceable without execution. By finding the promise 
supported by executed consideration, Justice Frampton con-
cluded that under the rule of the Godbey case there was an 
executed modification. 
There was also a provision in the original Healy-Brewster 
contract that it could be modified only by a written agreement. 
It was argued that this provision prevented any operative effect 
of the oral modification, execution and Civil Code section 
1698 notwithstanding. The court held that such a writing 
requirement could be waived by the party for whose protection 
it was inserted and that such a waiver had taken place. 
E. Modification under the Uniform Commercial Code 
Discussion of this problem would not be complete without 
some analysis of the solution contained in section 2209 of 
Article 2 (called Division 2 in California) of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. This article deals only with "sales" as 
defined in Uniform Commercial Code section 2106. Section 
2209 covers modification and rescission of contracts for the 
present or future sale of goods, as well as waiver of perform-
ance. While Healy involved a construction contract and not 
a sales contract, a study of the amendments made in the 
official text of Uniform Commercial Code section 2209 by 
the California Legislature aids in understanding the policy 
7. 39 Ca1.2d 429, 246 P.2d 946 
(1952). 
8. In Godbey, plaintiff alleged that he 
had agreed in a written contract to do 
cement work for the defendant. Later 
the written contract was orally modified 
to provide for a new basis of comput-
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was to be paid and to require plaintiff 
to submit daily reports to the defendant. 
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bargain, but defendant only paid a part 
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behind not only section 2209 but also Civil Code section 
1698 as well. 
Prior to the passage of the Uniform Commercial Code in 
California,9 the modification of sales contracts was governed 
by Civil Code section 1697 and section 1698, as were all 
other types of contracts. The official text of the Uniform 
Commercial Code was carefully studied by many different 
organizations and their recommendations for amendment were 
submitted to the Senate Fact Finding Committee on the 
Judiciary, to whom the legislation had been referred. The 
State Bar Committee and the Credit Organizations Committee 
recommended that section 2209 be deleted entirely. The 
report of Marsh and Warren recommended that the section 
be retained but substantially amended. lO The end result was 
that the section was retained but amended to the following 
form: 
2209. Modification, Rescission and Waiver 
( 1) An agreement modifying a contract within this 
division needs no consideration to be binding. 
(2) A written contract within this division may only 
be modified by a written agreement or by an oral agree-
ment fully executed by both parties. 
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section 
of this division (section 2201) must be satisfied if the 
contract as modified is within its provisions.ll 
( 4) Although an attempt at modification or rescis-
sion does not satisfy the requirements of subdivision (2) 
or (3) it can operate as a waiver. 
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an 
executory portion of the contract may retract the waiver 
by reasonable notification received by the other party 
9. Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 819. The ef-
fective date of the U.C.C. in California 
was Jan. 1, 1965. 
10. See Senate Fact Finding Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, Sixth Progress Re-
port to the Legislature, at 452 (Califor-
nia 1959-61). 
11. Subsection (3) was also omitted 
from the original enactment of the Cali-
fornia Code, but was added by amend-
ment in 1967. See Levy, COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS in this volume. 
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that strict performance will be required of any term 
waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view 
of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver. 
Section 2209 ( 1) follows the official text and departs en-
tirely from one of the basic restrictions of Civil Code section 
1698 by eliminating consideration as a requirement for modi-
fication. Within the sales field, therefore, it is no longer nec-
essary to worry about the difficulties created by the pre-
existing-duty bar. 
There still remains, however, a requirement that the re-
quest for "more money" or any other modification of terms 
must be in good faith. The justification for the pre-existing-
duty rule has always been that to hold otherwise would en-
courage commercial blackmail. Were it not for the pre-
existing-duty bar, a contracting party, obligated to perform, 
could without cause refuse performance unless he received 
"more money"; and the other party, realizing the disaster 
that would result from cessation of performance, would 
knuckle under and pay the unjust demand. 
The protection from the danger of blackmail under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, after elimination of the con-
sideration requirement, comes from section 1203 which pro-
vides: "Every contract or duty within this code imposes an 
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement," 
and from section 2103 (b), which provides: "'Good faith' 
in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observ-
ance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in 
the trade." The comment to the official text of section 2209 
explains: 
However, modifications made thereunder must meet 
the test of good faith imposed by this Act. The effective 
use of bad faith to escape performance on the original 
contract terms is barred, and the extortion of a "modifi-
cation" without legitimate commercial reason is ineffec-
tive as a violation of the duty of good faith. Nor can 
a mere technical consideration support a modification 
made in bad faith. 
92 CAL LAW 1967 
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The test of "good faith" between merchants or as 
against merchants includes "observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade" (sec-
tion 2-103), and may in some situations require an 
objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modifica-
tion. But such matters as a market shift which makes 
performance come to involve a loss may provide such 
a reason even though there is no such unforeseen dif-
ficulty as would make out a legal excuse from perform-
ance under sections 2-615 and 2-616. 
California omitted the official text subsection 2209 (2) and 
substituted an entirely new subdivision (2). The official text 
set forth a writing requirement only if the parties had so 
provided in the original written agreement, or if the contract 
as modified fell within the writing requirements of Uniform 
Commercial Code section 2-201.12 The California conclusion 
was to maintain the requirements of a writing or an "executed" 
agreement as contained in Civil Code section 1698. The 
result of the Godbey case, permitting consideration-supported 
modifications to be executed by performance of only one of 
the parties, was legislatively overruled by changing the words 
to "fully executed by both parties."13 
As originally enacted in California, section 2209 (3) was 
also omitted. As all modifications while executory are re-
quired to be in writing to be enforceable under California's 
section 2209 (2), there appeared to be no reason for section 
2209(3). However, as pointed out by Professor Coyne,14 the 
oral modification of an oral contract was overlooked. Section 
2209 (2) deals only with a written contract. Civil Code sec-
tion 1698, still in effect notwithstanding the Uniform Com-
12. Official text subsection 2209(2} 
reads as follows: "A signed agreement 
which excludes modification or rescis-
sion except by a signed writing cannot 
be otherwise modified or rescinded, but 
except as between merchants such a re-
quirement on a form supplied by the 
merchant must be separately signed by 
the other party." 
13. D. L. Godbey & Sons Constr. 
Co. v Deane, 39 Cal.2d at 432, 246 P. 
2d at 948 (1952). 
14. See Coyne, SOME COMMENTS ON 
CONTRACTS AND THE CALIFORNIA COM-
MERCIAL CODE, 1 U. San Francisco L. 
Rev. 1 (1967). 
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mercial Code, permits an oral modification of an oral contract 
as long as it is supported by consideration. An argument 
could be made, therefore, that although an oral sales contract 
covering goods for the price of $500 or more would be un-
enforceable under the Uniform Commercial Code section 
2201, an oral modification of that contract could be enforce-
able under Civil Code section 1698. To prevent the possi-
bility of any such conclusion, the official text of section 2209 
(3) was added in 1967. As to oral contracts not within 
section 2201, the modification rules of Civil Code section 
1697 apply. 
The effect of a waiver that fails to meet the requirements 
for an enforceable modification is covered by subsections 2209 
( 4) and (5). These provisions require some serious thought 
on the difference between them. The comment to the official 
text states: 
4. Subsection (4) is intended, despite the provisions 
of subsections (2) and (3), to prevent contractual pro-
visions excluding modification except by a signed writing 
from limiting in other respects the legal effect of the 
parties' actual later conduct. The effect of such conduct 
as a waiver is further regulated in subsection (5). 
"Waiver" is not defined in the Uniform Commercial Code but 
the comment provides the clue. A "modification" changes 
the terms of the contract by agreement. A "waiver" is one 
party's unilateral election not to require a term to be per-
formed, even though the obligation to perform exists. Sec-
tion 2209(5) shows that the waiver may be of some executory 
portion of the contract as well as of some performance pres-
ently due. The waiver of executory portions can be retracted 
at any time prior to material change of position. However, 
a waiver of a performance that has been due is an executed 
transaction and the same policy that enforces an executed oral 
modification enforces an executed waiver. These waiver pro-
visions of section 2209 do not change California law as it 
existed under Civil Code section 1698, and are in accord 
with the handling of waiver of the Healy case and other con-
tract classifications. 
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F. Implied Warranty 
While the discussion thus far has involved the receipt of 
additional compensation based on the enforceability of a 
promise, the Healy litigation also exemplifies the availability 
of a quite different theory, warranty; "more money" may come 
from a liability created by the original contract rather than 
from the enforcement of a subsequently promised payment. 
The trial court, on the retrial of the Healy case, made the 
following finding: 
The original Healy-Brewster contract which required 
Brewster to follow the Plans and Specifications con-
stituted an implied warranty by Healy that such Plans 
and Specifications were workable, correct and sufficient; 
Healy's submission to Brewster of the logs of corings 
constitute an express warranty by Healy that such Plans 
and Specifications were workable, correct and sufficient.15 
The appellate court affirmed this finding, relying on E. H. 
Morrill Company v. State of California16 and City of Salinas 
v. Souza & McCue Construction Company/7 both cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court of California during the reporting 
period. 
There is no doubt that under California law a contractor or 
subcontractor who has been furnished incorrect information 
as to soil conditions may have a cause of action under a 
breach of warranty theory for the increased expense caused 
by the true state of the soips It is equally well established 
that any such potential warranty liability is capable of effec-
tive disclaimer. If the mere presence of a disclaimer clause 
in the contract made the disclaimer automatically effective, 
the problem would be reasonably easy to solve. Only an 
15. 251 Cal. App.2d at 550, 59 Cal. Rptr. 634, 370 P.2d 338 (1962); Gogo 
Rptr. at 757 (1967). v. Los Angeles, etc. Flood Control Dist., 
16. 65 Cal.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 479, 45 Cal. App.2d 334, 114 P.2d 65 (1941). 
423 P.2d 551 (1967). See also United States v. Spearin, 248 
17. 66 Cal.2d 217, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337, U.S. 132, 63 L.ed. 166, 39 S.Ct. 59 
424 P.2d 921 (1967). (1918); Christie v. United States, 237 
18. Souza & McCue Constr. Co. v. U.S. 234, 59 L.ed. 933, 35 S.Ct. 565 
Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 508, 20 Cal. (1915). 
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interpretation of the clause to determine the scope of its appli-
cation would be necessary. What has happened, however, is 
that under certain situations the disclaimer clauses, although 
present in the contract, have been held to be ineffective.19 The 
real problem, therefore, is to recognize or even be able to 
articulate what invalidates a disclaimer. 
The leading California cases that have set the guidelines 
involve construction contracts with some governmental body 
which furnished misleading soil information. The Healy case 
was a step removed factually from the cases, the law of which 
it adopted. It will be recalled that the basic disclaimer of 
liability from incorrect soil representations was in the prime 
contract between Healy and the county. That disclaimer was 
adopted by Healy in his contract with Brewster by the agree-
ment that Brewster would be bound by all conditions imposed 
on Healy by the county.20 This gave Healy the benefit of 
the county's disclaimer clause, but if such disclaimer was 
ineffective it would not eliminate Healy's warranty liability. 
On this point the court, on retrial, cited the additional find-
ings: 
In the Court's view, it is unnecessary to the correct 
disposition of this case to decide whether Healy is en-
titled to the benefit of the County's attempted disclaimer 
of warranty as to the accuracy of the Plans and Specifi-
cations as a representation of actual soil conditions at 
the Airport site, since such a disclaimer would not pre-
clude relief from either the mutual mistake of fact or 
the bilateral resolution of the "hardpan" problem by a 
new executed oral agreement. However, the Court finds 
that Healy's warranty of the sufficiency of the Plans and 
Specifications is superior to the general disclaimer of 
warranty as to actual conditions.1 
Judge Frampton did not in any way indicate that this finding 
was in error. The finding is just a conclusion and the opinion 
19. See e.g., Thomas Kelly & Sons, 
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal. App. 
2d 539, 45 P.2d 223 (1935). 
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1. 251 Cal. App.2d at 552, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. at 759 (1967). 
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does not point out why the disclaimer was ineffective; it merely 
states that, under the cases cited, that result takes place. An 
attempt will be made, therefore, to summarize what factors 
invalidate a soil condition disclaimer. 
Taking the easiest case first, a disclaimer of liability is in-
effective where there has been an intentional misrepresentation 
of soil conditions. In Souza & McCue Construction Company 
v. Superior Courf a peremptory writ of mandamus was issued 
directing the superior court to allow the construction company 
to amend its answer and cross-complaint so as to include a 
claim for breach of implied warranty. The court stated: 
A contractor of public works who, acting reasonably, 
is misled by incorrect plans and specifications issued by 
the public authorities as the basis for bids and who, as a 
result, submits a bid which is lower than he would have 
otherwise made may recover in a contract action for extra 
work or expenses necessitated by the conditions being 
other than as represented. [citing cases] This rule is 
mainly based on the theory that the furnishing of mis-
leading plans and specifications by the public body con-
stitutes a breach of an implied warranty of their correct-
ness. The fact that a breach is fraudulent does not make 
the rule inapplicable. [citing cases] Souza's proposed 
pleading states causes of action in contract on the basis 
of the alleged fraudulent breach by Salinas.3 
The case was then tried and the trial court found that the City 
of Salinas had materially misrepresented soil conditions, by 
failing to inform Souza and other bidders of unstable condi-
tions known to it. The court therefore granted judgment 
against the city. In City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Con-
struction Company,4 the California Supreme Court (reversing 
only for the purpose of redetermining the amount of damage) 
rejected the city's contention that provisions in the contract 
specifications which required the bidders to "examine care-
2. 57 Cal.2d 508, 20 Cal. Rptr. 634, 4. 66 Ca1.2d 217, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 
370 P.2d 338 (1962). 424 P.2d 921 (1967). 
3. 57 Cal.2d at 510, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 
635, 370 P.2d at 339. 
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fully the site of the work" and stated that it is "mutually agreed 
that the submission of a proposal shall be considered prima 
facie evidence that the bidder has made such examination" 
prevents the city's liability. The court stated "it is clear that 
such general provisions cannot excuse a governmental agency 
for its active concealment of conditions."5 
The truly difficult case is where there is no conscious and 
intentional concealment but the soil conditions turn out to be 
disasterously other than represented. This in effect is the 
Healy case, and was also the situation in Wunderlich v. State 
ex reI. Department of Public Works6 and E. H. Morrill Com-
pany v. State.7 The Supreme Court of California rendered 
opinions in the latter two cases on the same day. Both opin-
ions were written by Justice Peek who also wrote the opinion 
in City of Salinas. In Wunderlich it was held that the dis-
claimer protected the state, while in Morrill it was held it did 
not. It takes the closest scrutiny to find the operative differ-
ences between the two cases. 
In both cases Justice Peek makes it clear that the result flows 
from a single determination: was there or was there not justifi-
able reliance on the part of the contractor? 
In the earlier case of A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State of 
California, 8 the court held that the presence of the disclaimer 
clause eliminates a justification for reliance. That is very close 
to the approach of Justice McComb in the Healy case. Justice 
Peek,on the other hand, eliminates the disclaimer clause as a 
conclusive factor. His opinion takes a much deeper inquiry. 
He carefully analyzes and compares the facts of Wunderlich 
and Morrill and decides that there are differences that justify 
opposite conclusions. A few of the factual differences will be 
set forth here. Whether the differences he finds establish suffi-
5. 66 Cal.2d at 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 
339, 424 P.2d at 923. 
6. 65 Cal.2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr. 473, 
423 P.2d 545 (1967). 
7. 65 Cal.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 479, 
423 P.2d 551 (1967). 
8. 238 Cal. App.2d 736, 48 Cal. Rptr. 
225 (1965). The court, in holding that 
98 CAL LAW 1967 
absent deliberate misrepresentation a 
disclaimer clause will always relieve the 
state of liability, limited the holding in 
Souza & McCue v. Superior Ct. to cases 
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claimer clauses. To the extent that 
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cient guidelines to render predictable the results of cases yet 
to be decided is at least debatable. 
In Morrill there were plans, specifications, and special condi-
tions attached to the written contract. One of those special 
conditions was a description of the soil in positive terms. In 
section 4 of the General Conditions was the usual lengthy dis-
claimer of warranty liability. Judge Peek held that the dis-
claimer did not overcome the positive statements. He dis-
tinguished Wunderlich by pointing out that the soil statement 
in that case was more a representation of what the state's soil 
tests disclosed, than a positive statement of actual soil condi-
tion. Furthermore, he found an important difference in the 
fact that in Wunderlich the reference to the soil conditions also 
drew attention to the existence of the disclaimer clause, while 
in Morrill the disclaimer was in a separate part of the instru-
ments and the disclaimer was not mentioned by cross-reference 
in the part of the agreement in which the soil statements were 
made. It was also pointed out in Wunderlich that the con-
tractor had available to him information on which the state's 
conclusions as to soil conditions were based, a fact found im-
portant in other cases having to decide this issue.9 
Justice Frampton classified Healy as being of the Morrill 
type where the disclaimer is not protective. While there was 
no elucidation in Judge Frampton's opinion as to why Morrill 
rather than Wunderlich controlled, the conclusion must neces-
sarily be that the drilling techniques and the manner in which 
the corings were handled by the county resulted in Brewster's 
"justifiable reliance" on those corings, notwithstanding the 
adopted disclaimer. 
In summary, about all that can be said is that warranty is 
one more theory that should be explored carefully when trying 
to work out a basis for additional compensation for a con-
tractor or subcontractor. When disclaimer is present, the 
factual search for "justifiable reliance" is going to control the 
disclaimer's effectiveness. 
9. See e.g., Walla Walla Port Dist. 
v. Palmberg, 280 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 
[1960]). 
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G. Conclusion 
Somewhere behind all of this law is a policy decision. From 
studying the many cases involving these problems, it is ap-
parent that it is very difficult for soil engineers to determine 
subsoil conditions. Even the best of them cannot predict with 
certainty what actually will be encountered when the ground 
is opened. To say that the contractor or subcontractor should 
make an independent investigation of conditions is no answer. 
The contractor's engineers are going to encounter the same 
difficulty of prediction that confronted government engineers. 
Contractors certainly are aware of this possibility of soil-
test error. In most cases, when the error comes to light and 
additional expense is imperative, the contracting parties will 
work out the "more money" by negotiation and without litiga-
tion. When negotiation fails, however, and a solution must be 
court-determined, about all that can be done is to decide wheth-
er the parties have determined, by agreement, which is to bear 
the risk of mistake. If there has been modification of the 
original contract to fix the loss, then the sole legal question is 
the enforceability of the modification agreement. If the court 
has nothing to work with except the original contract, then the 
risk-assumption problem is more difficult. Now that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has armed the construction industry with 
the Wunderlich and Morrill opinions, it is obvious what will 
happen. The strongest bargaining power usually lies with the 
government, or if a subcontract is involved, with the prime con-
tractor. There will now be an incantation of the language of 
the Wunderlich case to avoid the language of Morrill in future 
contracts. The result will be that the contractor will, more 
than ever, bear the risk of loss. Is this a good policy? These 
cases usually involve honest mistakes made by both parties. 
To throw the loss on to the party who is least able to absorb it, 
simply because he is in no position to protect himself, is some-
thing that should be given serious thought. The case law of 
contracts has had great difficulty over the years dealing with 
the inequities resulting from unequal bargaining power. If 
there is to be contractor protection, it may have to come from 
legislation. 
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At least the construction industry now has a better idea of 
when they will become the "stuckee" of these subsoil errors, 
but from now on there will probably be fewer situations when 
the contractors can protect themselves from this type of loss 
by the terms of the original contract. The industry probably 
will continue to do just as they have in the past-rely on their 
ability to negotiate a settlement after the error has been dis-
covered. There could be an attempt to cover the risk by in-
creasing the amount bid for the job, but competition makes 
that solution unlikely. Even after these new cases, the con-
tractor's real hope in this area remains the sense of fairness of 
the other contracting party. 
II. Uncertainty: The Incomplete Contract 
There has never been a lawyer with any appreciable amount 
of contract drafting experience who has not run into the prob-
lem of what to do when the parties to the agreement wish to 
defer the determination of some particular term or set of terms 
until a future date. There are endless reasons for this factual 
situation, at least one of which is lack of sufficient information 
at the time of drafting for the parties to be able to decide just 
how they want things handled. 
Before going into the recent cases it is well to point out in 
general terms what happens judicially to the uncertain agree-
ment. When the parties have stated that agreement on cer-
tain matters will be postponed, it may be declared that the 
postponement feature is proof that all that has gone on to date 
is part of the feeling-out process-negotiations preparatory to 
contract formation rather than contract creation.10 More 
often uncertainty prevents the existence of a contract where 
the parties fully intend one, but the agreement fails to provide 
the basis for the determination of the existence of a breach and 
the giving of an appropriate remedy.ll It is a much more 
painful job for a court to deprive a party of contract expect-
ancy where it is clear that a contract was intended, than to find 
that it was not reasonable for the party to conclude that the 
10. See Restatement (2d) of Contracts 
§ 32(3) (Tent. Draft No.1, 1964), and 
comment (c). 
11. See Restatement (2d) of Contracts 
§ 32(1) (Tent. Draft No.1, 1964) and 
comment (b). 
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formation process-offer and acceptance-had taken place. 
At times it is very difficult to tell from a court's decision which 
of these two types of uncertainty has prevented contract forma-
tion. 
Coleman Engineering Company v. North American Avia-
tion, Inc. 12 involved a contract for the manufacture by Coleman 
of special missile trailers for North American to accommo-
date its Hound Dog Missile. North American had invited bids 
and its invitation had included its basic specifications, includ-
ing a "configuration of the payload." Coleman therefore con-
cluded that the vertical center of gravity was established at rail 
height and submitted a bid, accompanied with a preliminary 
stress analysis report, showing its center-of-gravity interpreta-
tion. North American, after advising Coleman that it had 
been awarded the bid, delivered a series of purchase orders 
which contained the terms of the contract. Included was par-
agraph 9, captioned "CHANGES," by the terms of which 
North American reserved the right to change specifications. 
The paragraph also stated, "In such event there will be made 
an equitable adjustment in price and time of performance 
mutually satisfactory to Buyer and Seller, . . .'>13 It was 
this clause that set the stage for the lawsuit. The terms of the 
contract also contained a "termination for convenience" clause 
giving the buyer the right to terminate at any time in accord-
ance with section 8-706 of the Armed Services Procurement 
Regulation which provides, as the formula for payment upon 
such termination, expenses plus a certain profit. 
The controversy began when North American made known 
its desire to locate the center of gravity at 35 inches above rail 
height. It was their contention that the original specifications 
did not provide for location of the center of gravity and that 
their subsequent specification was not a "change," but a com-
pletion of the specifications of the original contract. For Cole-
man to construct the trailers with this higher center of gravity, 
rather than that originally assumed, meant an increase in cost 
12. 65 Cal.2d 396, 55 Cal. Rptr. 1, 13. 65 Cal.2d at 400, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
420 P.2d 713 (1966). at 4, 420 P.2d at 716, 
10~ CAL LAW 1967 
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of at least $257,000. It was Coleman's position that the 
specifying of the higher center of gravity was a "change," and 
that they were entitled to an additional amount and an exten-
tion of time for performance, all to be mutually agreed upon 
in accordance with paragraph 9. Coleman also claimed it was 
entitled to stop all work until the agreement was reached, and 
if agreement could not be reached that they were entitled to 
the payment provided for in the "termination for convenience" 
clause. North American claimed that not only was no change 
involved, but that refusal to continue manufacturing would 
constitute a breach of contract and a discharge of North Amer-
ican from all liability thereunder. 
Negotiation failed to provide any settlement, and North 
American gave notice of its claimed discharge by breach and 
made arrangements to procure the trailers elsewhere. Cole-
man sued on the formula of the termination clause, and North 
American counter claimed for the damages caused by having 
to buy the trailers elsewhere at a higher price. The trial court 
entered judgment for Coleman which was affirmed with some 
modification by the Supreme Court of California. The su-
preme court opinion was written by Justice Peters, witha dis-
sent by Chief Justice Traynor with whom Justice Mosk con-
curred. Rehearing was denied. The following is an analysis 
of those opinions. 
A. Existence of the Contract 
Before working out any rights thereunder, Justice Peters had 
to first decide whether there was any contract at all, because of 
the failure to provide a formula for determination of price and 
time of performance following a change order. He started out 
with the basic rule that "if an 'essential element' of a promise 
is reserved for the future agreement of both parties, the 
promise gives rise to no legal obligations until such future 
agreement is made. "14 Justice Peters then adopted the follow-
ing test to determine whether an element is essential: 
14. 65 Ca1.2d at 405, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
at 7, 420 P.2d at 719. 
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The enforceability of a contract containing a promise 
to agree depends upon the relative importance and the 
severability of the matter left to the future; it is a question 
of degree and may be settled by determining whether the 
indefinite promise is so essential to the bargain that in-
ability to enforce that promise strictly according to its 
terms would make unfair the enforcement of the re-
mainder of the agreement,15 
As to the effect of failure to agree on unessential terms, the 
same quotation continues: 
Where the matters left for future agreement are un-
essential, each party will be forced to accept a reasonable 
determination of the unsettled point or if possible the un-
settled point may be left unperformed and the remainder 
of the contract be enforced.16 
It then became necessary to determine whether such basic 
matters as price and time for performance could ever be any-
thing but "essential." As was pointed out, "change orders" 
present an exceptionally difficult area to apply "essentiality" 
tests. The importance of the failure to agree depends in turn 
on the importance of the change. There may never be a re-
quest for change, in which case the problem will never arise. 
On the other hand, as in Coleman, the change may affect such 
an important specification of manufacture as to make the orig-
inal price grossly inadequate. 
Because of this inability to evaluate the essentiality of the 
change at the time of contracting, and because the parties in-
tended a contract relationship, Justice Peters concluded that 
leaving the price and performance adjustments for future 
agreement did not prevent contract formation. Such conclu-
sion left many other difficult problems to be decided: (1) Was 
Coleman entitled to stop production while the parties were 
15. 65 Ca1.2d at 405, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
at 8, 420 P.2d at 720. For this quote 
Justice Peters cited City of Los Angeles 
v. Superior Court, 51 Ca1.2d at 433, 333 
P.2d at 750 (1959) and Metropolitan 
Water Dist. of S. Calif. v. Marquardt, 
104 CAL LAW 1967 
59 Cal.2d at 194, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 743, 
379 P.2d at 47 (1963). The same quote, 
oddly enough, appears in both of these 
cases. 
16. 65 Cal.2d at 405, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
at 8, 420 P.2d at 720. 
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trying to work out the increased compensation necessitated by 
the change order, or must it continue to manufacture under the 
changed specifications? (2) If the parties failed in good faith 
to arrive at an agreed figure, would Coleman be entitled to 
receive any recovery? (3) Would the result in any way be 
affected by the failure of either party to negotiate in good 
faith? (4) Can failure to agree be classified as a "termination 
for convenience"? 
Chief Justice Traynor in his dissenting opinion concluded 
that an agreement on the essential terms had not been reached, 
but for reasons other than the change order. He traced care-
fully the offer and acceptance stages of the contract formation. 
He found that Coleman's bid was the original offer; that on 
June 24,1959, North American sent five "go ahead" telegrams 
informing Coleman that it was the successful bidder, but that 
such telegrams contained new proposals and were therefore 
counter-offers;17 and that the telegrams made it clear that final 
arrangements were still to be made. On July 6, 1959, Cole-
man received the purchase orders, which stated that they be-
came the contract only after Coleman had accepted them. On 
July 7, Coleman met with the North American engineers and 
found out for the first time that there was a misunderstanding 
as to payload center of gravity. On July 15, Coleman acknowl-
edged and signed the purchase orders, but at that time both 
parties knew they were in disagreement as to the center of 
gravity and as to what should be paid if the construction was 
to be other than as had been originally interpreted by Coleman. 
Chief Justice Traynor, therefore, concluded that neither 
party had a right to assume that a contract had been formed. 
Justice Peters, on the other hand, used the same facts to con-
clude that North American, by permitting acknowledgment of 
the purchase orders without objection, had seen fit not to with-
draw its offer, that the written acknowledgment was accept-
ance, and that a contract had been formed. 
The two justices, therefore, each used different aspects of 
uncertainty. Justice Peters found an intention to be bound 
17. Cal. Civ. Code § 1585; American 2d 694 (1957); 1 Corbin, CONTRACTS 
Aeronautics Corp. v. Grand Central Air- (3rd. ed.) § 89, at 378-382 (1963). 
craft Co., 155 Cal. App.2d 69, 317 P. 
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and his only problem was whether the agreement provided a 
basis for the giving of an appropriate remedy. Chief Justice 
Traynor looked more to the other facet of uncertainty, that 
the parties were still trying to work out what both knew were 
unagreed-upon essential terms, and that the process of mutual 
assent had not yet been concluded. 
B. Stoppage of Hfork 
Starting with the assumption that a contract existed, receipt 
of a change order with no other pricing formula than mutual 
agreement forced Justice Peters to select from two alternatives. 
Did Coleman have to continue with production during the 
period when the parties were trying to work out the price, or 
might it have treated agreement on price as a condition pre-
cedent to its duty to continue? The latter alternative was held 
to be the law, which disposed of North American's contention 
that the work stoppage was a discharging breach by Coleman 
that freed North American from all further contractual obliga-
tions. The court admitted that if the matter involved in the 
change order was not an essential, then not only would the 
lack of a pricing formula not affect the existence of a contract, 
but also the manufacturer could not stop work without being 
in breach. 
Such a rule forces the manufacturer to a difficult decision. 
Although this change order is not of his doing, and is in no 
way under his control, its presence requires him to make the 
essentiality decision. If it is the correct one he is in no trouble, 
but if he should decide that the change is essential and stop 
when a court, exercising hindsight, finds it unessential, he has 
become the breaching party. Guessing right becomes the price 
he pays for the privilege to stop. IS 
Chief Justice Traynor objected to the majority's approach. 
He felt that to find lack of agreement to an essential term was 
18. This is no more unfair than rules 
found in other areas of contract law. 
For example, an innocent party whose 
duty of performance is subject to the 
other party's prior performance must 
decide at his peril whether he has re-
106 CAL LAW 1967 
ceived "substantial performance" which 
will mature his duty. If he makes the 
wrong decision whether "substantial per-
formance" has been rendered, and re-
fuses to perform because of it, he ends 
up in breach of contract. 
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a misuse of the essentiality test, because it resulted in making 
the duty to continue manufacture only conditional. In his 
opinion such failure to agree prevented formation rather than 
rendered further performance conditionaP9 
Justice Peters' decision comes very close to classifying the 
change provision of paragraph 9 of the contract as unessential 
in respect to the existence of the contract, yet essential in de-
termining the existence of the condition precedent. Such a 
result is not unpalatable, however, when neither party, at the 
time of contracting, has any way to know what change orders 
may lie ahead. 
C. Measure of Recovery 
The determination that a fixing of a new price following the 
change order was a condition precedent to Coleman's duty to 
proceed, gave it the right to stop performance and prevented 
that stoppage from being the discharging breach claimed by 
North American. It still left, however, the perplexing prob-
lem of whether Coleman was entitled to any recovery for work 
to date. Having the right to stop performing does not neces-
sarily give the right to recover for partial performance, es-
pecially when that performance has not conferred any mone-
tary benefit on the other party. Justice Peters carefully 
reviewed the facts and agreed with the findings of the trial 
court that Coleman had acted fairly and in good faith during 
the negotiations for settlement of the price controversy, and 
that North American had not. When negotiations failed and 
North American terminated, in its mistaken belief that Cole-
man was in breach because of its decision to stop production, 
it was held that such termination activated the "cost to date 
of termination plus profit percentage" formula of Armed Serv-
ices Procurement Regulation No. 8-706. 
There appears to be little difference between an outright 
decision to terminate on the part of a buyer who decides he 
does not want to purchase what has been ordered, and the 
tactic of placing a change order and then in bad faith refusing 
19. 65 Ca1.2d at 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
at 11, 420 P.2d at 723 (1966). 
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to agree on a price for that change, however reasonable are the 
overtures of the manufacturer. If this activation of the volun-
tary termination clause is tied to a bad-faith refusal of the pur-
chaser to negotiate, then the use of the clause seems correct. 
It is far more difficult to decide what should be done when 
both parties, in the best of faith, make every reasonable effort 
to work out a price figure but cannot do so. If this is called a 
voluntary termination by buyer, it means the buyer is going 
to bear the entire contract loss when he is no more at fault 
than the manufacturer. Faced with this kind of risk, for all 
practical purposes, his change-order privileges are severely 
restricted. Yet to hold that good-faith negotiations by both 
parties eliminates any voluntary termination results in the man-
ufacturer bearing the entire loss. 
Chief Justice Traynor in his dissent found a solution in the 
law of restitution. He pointed out that while the parties were 
trying to work out the center of gravity specifications, North 
American requested that Coleman continue to perform. When 
it was finally determined that an agreement could not be 
reached, Chief Justice Traynor preferred the conclusion that 
such failure prevented contract formation but that because of 
the request that performance be continued during the negotia-
tion, Coleman was entitled to the reasonable value of the serv-
ices performed. 
The trouble, if any, with this solution is that although Cole-
man's performance was requested, it did not result in any 
benefit being received by North American. The idea that a 
requested performance resulting in benefit can be the basis for 
recovery of the reasonable value of the performance is not 
new in California. Permitting such recovery without benefit 
is new. Such a theory has received recognition elsewhere,20 
and Chief Justice Traynor would apply that doctrine here. As 
the majority of the California Supreme Court were of the opin-
ion that a contract had been formed, there is no indication 
how the majority would have held on this issue of recovery for 
20. See Kearns v. Andree, 107 Conn. proposition that the rule of recovery is 
181, 139 A. 695, 59 A.L.R. 599 (1928); based on moral obligation rather than 
Abrams v. Financial Servo Co., 13 Utah on benefit conferred, see Note, 26 Mich. 
2d 343, 374 P.2d 309 (1962). For the L. Rev. 942 (1928). 
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requested performance which resulted in no benefit to the de-
fendant. 
D. The Uniform Commercial Code 
The one possibility that was not discussed in either opinion 
was that of implying a reasonable price to be determined by 
the court when the parties could not agree. The Coleman 
case was governed by the Uniform Sales Act, as all facts were 
prior to January 1, 1965, the effective date of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Under Sales Act section 9, which was 
adopted in California in 1931 as Civil Code section 1729, it 
was provided: 
Definition and Ascertainment of Price-( 1) The price 
may be fixed by the contract, or may be left to be fixed 
in such manner as may be agreed, or it may be determined 
by the course of dealing between the parties. 
(2) The price may be made payable in any personal 
property. 
( 3) Where transferring or promising to transfer any 
interest in real estate constitutes the whole or part of the 
consideration for transferring or for promising to transfer 
the property in goods, this act shall not apply. 
( 4) Where the price is not determined in accordance 
with the foregoing provisions the buyer must pay a rea-
sonable price. What is a reasonable price is a question 
of fact dependent on the circumstances of each particular 
case. 
Case law had determined that, under this section, specifically 
providing in a contract that the price was to be agreed upon 
by the parties did not shift the formula to reasonable price 
when such agreement failed.1 
The California Commercial Code now has quite different 
prOVISIOns. It provides: 
Section 2305. Open Price Term. (1) The parties if 
they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even 
1. See California Lettuce Growers v. 
Union Sugar Co., 45 Ca1.2d 474, 289 P. 
2d 785, 49 A.L.R.2d 496 (1955). Cf. 
Roberts v. Adams, 164 Cal. App.2d 312, 
330 P.2d 900 (1958); Ablett v. Clauson, 
43 Cal.2d 280, 272 P.2d 753 (1954). 
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though the price is not settled. In such a case the price 
is a reasonable price at the time for delivery if 
(a) Nothing is said as to price; or 
(b) The price is left to be agreed by the parties and 
they fail to agree; or 
( c ) The price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed 
market or other standard as set or recorded by a third 
person or agency and it is not so set or recorded. 
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer 
means a price for him to fix in good faith. 
(3) When a price left to be fixed otherwise than by 
agreement of the parties fails to be fixed through fault 
of one party the other may at his option treat the contract 
as cancelled or himself fix a reasonable price. 
(4) Where, however, the parties intend not to be 
bound unless the price be fixed or agreed and it is not 
fixed or agreed there is no contract. In such a case the 
buyer must return any goods already received or if un-
able so to do must pay their reasonable value at the time 
of delivery and the seller must return any portion of the 
price paid on account. 
Had the Uniform Commercial Code been applicable, sec-
tion 2305 ( 1 ) (b) would have applied to the majority's inter-
pretation of the Coleman facts. Just how it would have aided 
the outcome is not clear. Only the court can determine the 
reasonable price if the parties cannot agree. It will take time 
for price to be settled by litigation. The Coleman case makes 
it clear that although the manufacturer is not discharged dur-
ing the price-fixing period, he can at least stop performing for 
that period. The next question is whether, after the price is 
finally fixed, the manufacturer must proceed and the buyer 
must accept performance. The answer to this lies with the 
rules applicable to temporary impossibility. In most in-
stances, if the delay is for any appreciable time, further per-
formance cannot be required of either party.2 
2. See Autry v. Republic Productions, Restatement of Contracts § 462 and 
Inc., 30 Ca1.2d 144, 180 P.2d 888 (1947); comment (a). 
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The manufacturer could waive the condition precedent, 
proceed to completion and then sue for his price to be fixed 
by the court in the litigation. But by so doing he could obtain 
nothing until judgment was rendered, and would therefore be 
forced to extend credit to the buyer even though the contract 
might have provided otherwise. 
It should be noted that Commercial Code section 2305 ( 4 ) 
recognizes that failure to agree on price can prevent formation, 
but does not necessarily do so. Chief Justice Traynor, had the 
section been applicable in Coleman, possibly would have con-
sidered the facts to fall under this subdivision. The case il-
lustrates all too well how difficult is the fact-finding job when 
the existence of a contract rests entirely upon intention to be 
bound. 
The Uniform Commercial Code backs to the fullest degree 
the position of Justice Peters; if the parties intend to be bound, 
the common-law niceties of offer and acceptance should not 
destroy a contractual relationship. Uniform Commercial Code 
section 2204 (3) states: 
( 3) Even though one or more terms are left open 
a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the 
parties have intended to make a contract and there is 
a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate 
remedy. 
Locking the parties together by contract in Coleman ac-
complished the purposes of this section, and using the volun-
tary termination clause supplied a convenient "reasonably 
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." 
E. Conclusion 
While the foregoing has by necessity contained much con-
jecture, at least one thing is certain-every problem in the 
case could have been obviated by careful drafting. An agree-
ment to agree or a contract to make a contract spells trouble. 
Many more suitable formulas are available, such as providing 
The difficulty dealt with in Autry, of may lend more credence to the theories 
trying to apply a reasonable price for- advanced by Justice Traynor in his dis-
mula in cases of delayed performance, sent in Coleman. 
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for arbitration, or any number of other price-setting devices, 
should the parties fail to reach agreement. Perhaps Chief 
Justice Traynor's opinion would further the necessity for such 
clauses. Drafting can also settle the duty to continue per-
formance while the price is being determined. It may well be 
that covering these problems originally could have held up 
contract formation while they were negotiated and worked 
out. But it is seriously doubted that, had they been carefully 
covered in the purchase order forms of North American, it 
would in any way have deterred Coleman in acknowledging 
and accepting those orders; in fact, it might have encouraged 
such action. 
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